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WE FAILED TO PLAN, OR EVEN RECOGNIZE THE RISK 
We didn’t plan well for the COVID-19 pandemic and we are paying the 
price and will continue to do so, maybe for a generation or more. As planners, we 
pride ourselves, and appropriately so, with planning for natural disasters, like floods 
and fires, and disasters caused by our own mistakes and accidents, like oil spills 
and manufacturing explosions, as well as terrorism.  The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) has done much good work in that regard,1 though it 
has had its critics.2  Planning for disaster mitigation and response has been 
something in which I have been involved as a writer and speaker since the first 
attack on the World Trade Center on April 26, 1993,3 six years before the Twin 
Towers were brought down on September 11, 2001.  My late co-author, Rufus 
Calhoun Young, Jr., and I wrote a chapter in an American Bar Association book on 
the subject and I have rewritten it twice since for the two later editions.4 
We didn’t consider a pandemic.  Neither did FEMA, for the most part.  
Going back into its considerable on-line resources, where I have spent much time 
 
* Dwight H. Merriam, FAICP, a lawyer and land use planner, is a Fellow in the American College 
of Real Estate Lawyers, a Fellow and Past President and of the American Institute of Certified 
Planners, and Past Chair of the ABA Section of State and Local Government Law. He has 
published over 200 articles and 13 books, including co-editing the treatise Rathkopf’s The Law of 
Zoning and Planning. UMass BA (cum laude), UNC MRP, and Yale JD. 
www.dwightmerriam.com 
1 FEMA, Hazard Mitigation Planning, available at:  https://www.fema.gov/hazard-mitigation-
planning 
2 Steve Cohen, FEMA’s Failure and the Catastrophe of Our Federal Government, Earth Institute, 
Columbia University (July 15, 2019). https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2019/07/15/femas-failure-
catastrophe-federal-government/ 
3 World Trade Center Is Bombed, History.com (February 9, 2010). https://www.history.com/this-
day-in-history/world-trade-center-bombed    
4, Rufus Calhoun Young, Jr. and Dwight H. Merriam, Homeland Security Begins at Home: Local 
Planning and Regulatory Review to Improve Security, in Ernest B. Abbott and Otto J. Hetzel, A 
Legal Guide to Homeland Security and Emergency Management for State and Local Governments 
(2006); Second Edition (2010); Third Edition  (2018) 
https://www.americanbar.org/products/inv/book/283296313/  Nowhere in the chapter I authored, 
Hazard Mitigation Planning, Chapter 7, is there mention of pandemics or contagion. 
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in research and educating myself over many years, I can find little of planning for 
the pandemic. There is a 25-page checklist for planning entitled “Key Elements of 
Departmental Pandemic Influenza Planning.”5 Get into the footnotes and you will 
find a hopeful link right to the White House.6 Excellent.  Click on that link and you 
will get this: “That page cannot be found, or is located on an archived web page.”  
So much for pandemic planning at the national level. 
An undated discussion guide on the FEMA site, “PREPTalks: New 
Perspectives for Emergency Managers,”7 addresses the work of John Barry, who 
wrote the book “The Great Influenza: The Story of the Deadliest Pandemic in 
History,” a 2004 study of the 1918 pandemic, which the National Academies of 
Science selected as the year’s outstanding book on science or medicine. Barry’s 
work is summarized in an article published by the Smithsonian, “How the Horrific 
1918 Flu Spread Across America.”8 The PREPTalk is a mere nine pages. 
One two-page pamphlet by FEMA gives us “Continuity Planning for 
Pandemic Influenza” 9 and directs the reader to The World Health Organization,10 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,11 and the Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention,12 noting unhelpfully as to the CDC reference that “This 




5 FEMA, Key Elements of Departmental Pandemic Influenza Plans, available at:  
https://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/org/ncp/meta_checklist.pdf 
6 Broken, but referenced link.  http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/pandemicflu      
7 FEMA, Prep Talks Discussion Guide, The Next Pandemic:  Lessons from History, available at:  
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1519130028450-
b6847c4c99e6485190885e3e0259350c/PrepTalks_Discusion_Guide_Barry.pdf 
8 Barry, John M., How the Horrific 1918 Flu Spread Across America, Smithsonian Magazine, 
November 2017, available at:  https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/journal-plague-year-
180965222/  
9 FEMA brochure, Continuity Planning for Pandemic Influenza, https://www.fema.gov/media-
library-data/1410875581685-
0729ba3e23e9b0016bbf18efcd6daa59/COOP_Pandemic_Influenza.pdf 
10 World Health Organization, http://www.who.int/en/  
11 Health and Human Services, http://www.hhs.gov/ and Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, Pandemic Influenza, http://www.pandemicflu.gov/  
12 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009 H1N1 Flu, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/  
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THE PANDEMIC PLANNING PROBLEM 
Like other disaster planning processes, there are two levels of planning.   
-Mitigation and Adaptation Planning 
The first step is to mitigate the potential for harm. This is mitigation 
planning. We do this when we hurricane-proof homes through design and 
construction.  We do this in requiring construction to be above some base flood 
elevation. We do this in our climate change plans by taking actions to reduce and 
curb greenhouse gas emissions. 
The “on-the-other-hand” of mitigation planning is adaptation planning.  
Adaptation planning recognizes that we can never fully mitigate all risk and instead 
must accept that risk and deal with it as best we can. Examples of that planning are 
understanding that global climate change to some extent is presently inevitable.  
Adaption planning for climate change includes actions taken to reduce vulnerability 
to climate change.  As described by the International Centre for Research in 
Agroforestry (ICRAF), based in Nairobi, Kenya: 
Developing countries are going to bear the brunt of climate change 
and suffer most from its negative impacts. Global conventions are 
not sufficiently effective to halt the increase of atmospheric 
greenhouse gases (GHG) concentrations, and we now accept that the 
primary drivers of climate change are not going to stop. Mitigation 
efforts will therefore only provide a partial softening of the effects 
of climate change.13 
California’s “Adaptation Planning Guide” puts it this way:  
Climate change is already affecting California and is projected to 
continue to do so well into the foreseeable future. Current and 
projected climate changes include increased temperatures, sea level 
rise (SLR), a reduced winter snowpack, altered precipitation 
patterns, and more frequent storm events. These changes have the 
potential for a wide variety of impacts such as altered agricultural 
 
13 L. Verchot et al., Climate change: linking adaptation and mitigation through agroforestry, 
Published online: 28 April 2007  Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007.   
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productivity, wildfire risk, water supply, public health, public 
safety, ecosystem function, and economic continuity.14 
There are no neat boundaries here, between mitigation planning and adaptation 
planning.  They often conflict and typically overlap. Part of the challenge is to make 
both approaches work in harmony.15 
 -Disaster Response and Recovery Planning 
The second level of planning, tied back in some ways to mitigation and 
adaptation planning, is response and recovery planning.  In the natural disaster 
context, having stockpiles of medical supplies is an example.  Preparing the 
National Guard to respond post-disaster is another.   
Pandemic mitigation is limited.  It would require stopping it before it gets 
here.  Helping other countries contain it might reduce the risk.  Better screening, 
including questionnaires and taking temperatures, might help some, but our borders 
are so porous that it is probably fruitless.  Early detection, tracking, strict travel 
restrictions, and aggressive quarantining to stop it could work…if done quickly and 
with no compromises.  New Zealand’s elimination approach appears to have done 
that. Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern imposed a strict  lockdown starting on March 
23, 2020, one month after the country had its first reported case, and at a time so 
early on that there were only 102 cases and no deaths.16  Out of its five million 
people there were just 1500 reported cases and 20 deaths.  On May 9, 2020, it was 
reported that New Zealand had it first day of no new cases.  
The COVID-19 pandemic planning debacle elsewhere is in large measure 
one of inadequate, often nonexistent, preparation for both the response and the 
recovery.  The news has been filled with stories about N-95 masks, ventilators, 
hospital beds, and even beauty salon owners scrambling for PPE, now a common 
term for Personal Protective Equipment. It is not as if no one knew of potential risk 
 
14 California Adaptation Planning Guide: Planning for Adaptive Communities, California 
Emergency Management Agency and California Natural Resources Agency (2012). 
https://resources.ca.gov/CNRALegacyFiles/docs/climate/01APG_Planning_for_Adaptive_Comm
unities.pdf 
15 S. Moser, Adaptation, mitigation, and their disharmonious discontents :  An essay, Climatic 
Change 111(2):165-175 (March 2012). 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227583959_Adaptation_mitigation_and_their_disharmo
nious_discontents_An_essay 
16 S. Collins,  New Zealand eliminates COVID-19, The Lancet (May 9, 2020). 
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)31097-7/fulltext 
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for hair salon employees from other hazards in the workplace.  The Occupational 
Safety  and Health Administration (OSHA) has for years enforced a formaldehyde 
standard requiring eye protection, gloves, skin washing equipment, air testing, 
respirators, warning signs, and training.17  That’s good, but it wasn’t until April 11, 
2020, that OSHA promulgated its “Interim Enforcement Response Plan for 
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19).”18   
What happened?  As with 9/11,19 looking back there was plenty of evidence 
of what was forthcoming.  So too with the COVID-19 pandemic.  A forum held at 
Georgetown University in January 2017, included Dr. Anthony Fauci, now so well-
known that one can buy a Dr. Fauci bobble head,20 who said this:  
The history of the last 32 years that I have been the director of the 
NIAID will tell the next administration that there is no doubt they 
will be faced with the challenges their predecessors were faced with.  
Dr. Fauci also made this key point:  
What about the things we are not even thinking about?  No matter 
what, history has told us definitively that [outbreaks] will happen 
because [facing] infectious diseases is a perpetual challenge. It is not 
going to go away. The thing we’re extraordinarily confident about 
is that we’re going to see this in the next few years. 21 
 
17 Hair Salons: Facts about Formaldehyde in Hair Products, OSHA (undated).  
https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/hairsalons/protecting_worker_health.html 
18 April 13, 2020, Memorandum for: regional administrators state plan designees, Through: 
Amanda Edens, Deputy Assistant Secretary, From: Patrick Kapust, Acting director 
Directorate of Enforcement Programs, Subject: Interim Enforcement Response Plan For 
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). https://www.osha.gov/memos/2020-04-13/interim-
enforcement-response-plan-coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19 
19 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report. 
https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf 
20 A.Elassar, A bobblehead of Dr. Fauci will help pay to produce masks for health workers 
CNN (April 5, 2020). https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/05/us/dr-fauci-national-bobblehead-hall-of-
fame-trnd/index.html 
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The reality of what happened is that we knew about some of the unknowns, 
but some we simply didn’t fathom. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
spoke about “known unknowns” and “unknown unknowns” in remarks that some 
initially derided as gobbledygook, but when considered more carefully can explain 
what happens when we cannot even imagine the worst case or are prevented from 
doing so by a lack of bandwidth when there is so much demanding our attention 
more directly and more frequently, like tornados and floods: 
The message is that there are no "knowns." There are things we 
know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say there 
are thing [sic] that we now know we don't know. But there are also 
unknown unknowns. There are things we don't know we don't know. 
So when we do the best we can and we pull all this information 
together, and we then say well that's basically what we see as the 
situation, that is really only the known knowns and the known 
unknowns. And each year, we discover a few more of those 
unknown unknowns.22 
The pandemic planning problem then is we need to simultaneously 
undertake both mitigation and adaptation planning, while we prepare for post-
pandemic recovery, all in a world where our attention is limited, our resources 
inadequate, our assessment of the risk too low to justify providing the needed 
treatment capacity, and there are unknowns, including some that were unknown to 
be unknown.  The most recent example of an “unknown unknown” is an emergent 
illness now being called “Pediatric Multi-System Inflammatory Syndrome 
Potentially Associated with COVID-19” increasingly found in young children.23  
No one imagined this, nor could they have. If it proves to be concomitant to 
COVID-19, that will likely change our planning.  That too, the mutable charter of 
planning, is a key point with all planning.  It is iterative and interactive.  One step 
builds on the prior and all of the steps feedback and refine all of the others.  It is 
neither linear nor static. 
THE PANDEMIC PLANNING MODEL 
Everyone is eager for the coronavirus to peak and to pass and for us to restart 
the economy. Some countries think they are there now.  The Seychelles, for 
 
22 Secretary Rumsfeld Press Conference at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium June 6, 2002. 
Official transcript from U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(Public Affairs). Available at https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020606g.htm.  
23 N. Fleisler, COVID-19 and a serious inflammatory syndrome in children: Unpacking recent 
warnings, Children’s Hospital (May 8, 2020). 
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example, which has had no reported deaths, lifted its restrictions on May 4, 2020, 
reopened its schools on May 11, 2020, and ended travel restrictions with the 
reopening on the airport on June 1, 2020.24  
Will the restarts everywhere be the result of thoughtful and comprehensive 
planning -- or the product of haste and political expediency? How can we take 
advantage of the professional planning resources we have?  In approaching the 
monumental task of rebuilding and restarting the economy, we should consider how 
different the outcomes are when we either plan or do not plan ahead. 
To underscore the importance of comprehensive planning for our economic 
security in the “new normal” of a post-coronavirus economy, a recent report by 
the Ifo Institute for Economic Research co-authored by 12 academics delivered this 
imperative: "Planning for this transition must begin immediately in politics, 
administration, companies and other organizations."25  
In other words, every nation needs not just a goal for restarting their 
economy, they need a plan. 
We need economic recovery, but we must also avoid a resurgence of 
coronavirus. We cannot wait for a vaccine, which is unlikely to be fully developed 
until sometime late in 2021. Finally, it is clear that we will need to continue social 
distancing and accept the reality of continued lockdowns for certain groups of 
individuals, such as older people with health issues and those who test positive for 
the virus but whose illness has not run its course. 
Professor Joseph T. Wu from the University of Hong Kong, one of the 
dozen academics who authored the Ifo report, put it this way: "Although control 
policies such as physical distancing and behavioral change are likely to be 
maintained for some time, proactively striking a balance between resuming 
economic activities and keeping the reproductive number below one (the number 
 
24  Seychelles and COVID-19: Movement restrictions to be lifted next week; schools, daycare to 
reopen later in May, Seychelles News Agency. Retrieved 29 April 2020. 
25 E. Reynolds, Lockdowns shouldn’t be fully lifted until corona virus vaccine found, new stud 
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of people on average that one person with Covid-19 will infect) is likely to be the 
best strategy until effective vaccines become widely available."26 
In balancing risk and reward, any plan must begin with testing those who 
are well.  Many are asymptomatic and most will eventually show symptoms.  They 
and we need to know who they are.  Testing is now available with results in 15 
minutes or less and those who test positive will need to quarantine. However, the 
resources for widespread testing are still unavailable. 
Testing those who are well is critical to economic recovery because our new 
normal workforce will be led by people who have had the virus and are no longer 
contagious, assuming research concludes they do gain some immunity (another 
“known unknown”) as well as those who test negative for the virus. 
As much as we want to protect our children, it is important to reopen day 
care and schools as soon as possible.  Children do not typically have severe 
symptoms, parents are kept from work by having to stay home with their children, 
and distant learning has proved problematic, especially for the children who need 
the most help. Could there be a transitional program of allowing children and 
teachers who test negative back into the daycares and classrooms with parental 
approval?  
 The right-leaning American Enterprise Institute has issued a “Blueprint for 
Back to School” encouraging rolling two-to-four week closures after schools 
reopen in the fall, social distancing, temperature checks, protections for at risk 
teachers and administrators, and  plans for the next two and three years as the 
reopening evolves.27  
Besides workforce issues, other building blocks for economic recovery 
include targeting certain economic sectors. For example, economic planning efforts 
in Germany suggest telecommunications and automobile production should be 
given priority in boosting the economy.  
 
26 E. Reynolds, Lockdowns shouldn’t be fully lifted until corona virus vaccine found, new stud 
warns, CNN (April 9, 2020).https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/09/world/lockdown-lift-vaccine-
coronavirus-lancet-intl/ 
27 E. Blad, COVID-19:  Report Offers ‘Blueprint’ for Reopening Schools and Beyond, Education 
Wee, (May 4, 2020). https://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2020/05/covid-19-reopen-
schools-aei.html; A blueprint for back to school, American Enterprise Institute (May 4, 2020) 
https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/a-blueprint-for-back-to-school/ 
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Those who can work effectively and efficiently at home should continue to 
do so.  Professional firms, such as law firms, and many offices can and should do 
that to the extent they can. 
The construction and real estate development industries have been 
devastated. The work cannot be done at home. With proper testing and commitment 
to social distancing, they too should have some priority. 
What businesses will be permitted to reopen on what basis?  Can restaurants 
reopen if they use only every other table to maintain six feet of social distancing?  It 
is important to consider the positive psychological effects of something close to 
normalcy and a good meal out with two or three friends could make the continuing 
restrictions tolerable.  
Can movie theaters reopen if patrons, except those coming as a couple or 
three or four as a group, have two seats open on each side and one front and 
back?  A soda, a bucket of buttered popcorn and an action flick with booming 
surround sound might be a quick cure for cabin fever.  
Can barber shops and hair salons open if they maintain social distancing 
and staff and customers wear masks? 
The travel industry will be the last to restart.  Travel restrictions will need 
to be considered and the last places to reopen will be the resort hotels.  It is 
unfortunate for that sector, but it is probably a reality of how we must continue to 
limit contagion where we can. 
In the end, the plan must be one that proceeds in baby steps, with constant 
feedback on how it is working.  The plans will vary across the landscape with some 
of the higher density places of public gatherings and contact restricted more than in 
outlying areas.  It should accordingly be more than a state plan; every city, town, 
and county in the state must participate in developing it and must have some 
discretion in tailoring the plan to local needs and objectives.  
A HIERARCHICAL PARTNERSHIP 
It is a contradiction of terms to call for a hierarchical partnership, but that is 
what we already have, to some degree, in federalism, and in other planning 
structures, including emergency management.  What has happened with the 
COVID-19 pandemic, however, is that the need for immediate action has caused 
both the federal and state governments to declare emergencies and issue highly-
directive orders. It is likely that some of these actions will be found to exceed 
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executive authority, even in the emergency, and some will be held unconstitutional 
as violating separation of powers, free speech, free exercise of religion, procedural 
due process, and the taking of private property without compensation. 
Better planning could have avoided this and we can now learn from what 
went wrong and reduce future error.  Structurally, the federal government should 
lead on national and international issues, particularly in its unique realm of political 
diplomacy.  The pandemic has brought home that we are one world, where a fatal 
disease can be spread half way around the world in less than a day.  We need our 
national governments to be out ahead of rising risks and to take fast action. 
-How Covid-19 Differs from Other Disasters 
Before going further to describe the hierarchical partnership, let us pause to 
consider what makes this planning process different than others involving disasters. 
First, the COVID-19 impact has varied greatly across the country 
geographically.  New York has had the highest death rate at 137/100,000 persons 
as of May 10, 2020. Montana, Alaska, Hawaii, and Wyoming all have 1/100,000. 
28   Among the states in absolute numbers, Alaska has the lowest number of deaths 
at 9, while New York has the most — 19,989.  This geographic variation might 
seem a little like that typical of flooding, tornados, and wildfires.  But one important 
difference is that the shutdown in one region adversely affects others because of the 
increased economic dependencies that have evolved with modern commerce.   
Second, the timing varies across the country and the pandemic is longer 
running than other disasters. Tennessee hit its peak hospital bed usage on April 4, 
2020; nationally that occurred on April 19; and the last peak projected is North 
Dakota on May 15.29  That is 41 days between peak hospital bed usage.  It suggests 
reopening schedules could vary by up to 41 days spread, all other things being 
equal, which they are not.  The spread could be longer or shorter.   Again, the 
interdependencies between regions means that one region may be hampered in its 
reopening to the extent it is dependent on another region that cannot reopen. 
Finally, the micro-geographic and micro-timing issues extend all the way 
down from a state’s largest city to its smallest hamlet.  Connecticut still has one 
 
28 Statista, Death rates from coronavirus in the United States by state, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1109011/coronavirus-covid19-death-rates-us-by-state/ 








town out of its 169 contiguous cities and towns with no reported COVID-19 cases, 
even though state has suffered 32,984 cases and 2,932 deaths as of May 9, 2020.30  
In Utah, Beaver, Rich, Wayne, Piute and Daggett counties as of April 26 had not 
reported a single, confirmed COVID-19 infection.31 Nationally, over half the 
counties have no reported COVID-19 deaths.32  
The COVID-19 pandemic differs from other disasters in that its widespread 
impact varies greatly, the timing of its impacts varies and is spread out over many 
weeks, and even in relatively small geographic areas the impacts can vary greatly 
within short distances. 
-Top Down and Bottom Up Planning 
The key to successful pandemic planning is a hybrid approach that respects 
the federal-state-local division of responsibilities and at the same time aggressively 
solicits input, direction, involvement, and intellectual contributions from each and 
every city and town. 
We have 40,000 members in the American Planning Association, most are 
professional planners, the rest are principally experienced elected and appointed 
officials.  That is the same number of people as the entire U.S. Marine Reserve 
force.33 The substate regional planning agencies and governments, and the state 
governments, need to bring all those local professional and law planning 
capabilities to bear on the pandemic planning process.  Those resources are virtually 
free and that army of planners can help populate the marketplace of ideas in the 
pre-pandemic and post-pandemic recovery planning process.  All of the plans — 
 
30 Cases of COVID-19 Reported in Connecticut by Town, 
https://connecticut.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/052f57eabb654d59a2178859
18065417 
31 B. Winslow, A handful of Utah communities have no confirmed cases of COVID-19, FOX13 
 (April 26, 2020). https://www.fox13now.com/news/coronavirus/local-coronavirus-news/a-
handful-of-utah-communities-have-no-confirmed-cases-of-covid-19 
32 N. Micel, Over Half of U.S. Counties Have Had No COVID-19 
Deaths.https://www.heritage.org/public-health/commentary/over-half-us-counties-have-had-no-
covid-19-deaths  
33 Department of Defense (DoD) Releases Fiscal Year 2017 President’s Budget Proposal 
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substate regional plans, state plans, multi-state regional plans, and federal plans — 
will be better by bringing in that local knowledge.   
As businesses reopen, the most successful results will come from reopening 
those that meet the federal and state criteria. Those criteria applied across a 
landscape where the incidence and timing of COVID-19 varies greatly will result 
in recovery plans that vary as well. Those variations are best identified and 
implemented by locals.  Testing and tracking are critical, yet so far we see little 
evidence that federal and state authorities are enlisting local planners in helping 
find people to do that work and in guiding the effort at the local level. That is 
especially unfortunate because it is the local planners who have the greatest 
knowledge as to resources and needs. 
SUMMARY 
 The COVID-19 pandemic has been a failure in planning, partly because 
government didn’t do its job and partly because there were so many unknowns.  
The response has been flawed because the federal and state executive branches have 
been task-oriented and quick to act after an overly-slow start, all along largely 
ignoring local resources.  
 We can and do learn from our mistakes.  Doing a better job means 
recognizing the need to embrace the hierarchical partnership and to capitalize on 
the substantial planning resources available, so far tragically largely ignored. 
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